Via the Miami Herald we find out that the CIA has declassified a cache of documents pertaining to the Bay of Pigs invasion. It’s basically more confirmation of what I’ve said here before, that Kennedy was more concerned with the political implications if US involvement was revealed than with the success of the actual mission.
The documents also underscore the extremes the United States went to maintain “plausible denial’’ of Washington’s role in the April 1961 invasion by CIA-trained Cuban exiles.
“These documents go to the heart of the historical debate over the Bay of Pigs — the issue of plausible denial,’’ said Peter Kornbluh, senior analyst at the National Security Archive, a Washington-based nonprofit research organization that had sought the documents for years and was instrumental in gaining their release.
Concerned that Washington’s hands could be traced to the invasion, the Kennedy administration kept scaling it back, said Kornbluh. It cut back on planned air raids on Cuban airfields and insisted on a problematic night-time landing of the invasion force.
By the way Kornbluh is a blowhard who is also an apologist for the castro regime.
I have previously written about Kennedy’s decision making process at the time of the invasion. Here it is in its entirety:
by Henry Gomez
By now we all know that the idea of the Bay of Pigs invasion was born in the Eisenhower administration and that there were many strategic and tactical errors committed in its planning and implementation. We also know that the decision to hold back American air support was a crucial one because without air superiority any invasion was destined to fail. The reason for the decision was ostensibly to keep up the curtain of “plausible deniability.” In doing so John F. Kennedy and “the best and the brightest” put secrecy ahead of success when they inherited the operation.
When you look at the invasion and the two goals (success and deniability) we see that there could only have been four outcomes. They are listed here, from most desirable to least desirable.
- Invasion a success, US deniability maintained.
- Invasion a success, US deniability not maintained.
- Invasion a failure, US deniability maintained.
- Invasion a failure, US deniability not maintained.
The above ranking assumes that the strategic goal of having the invasion succeed was at least as important to Kennedy and his advisers as the political goal of keeping US involvement secret. But looking back it’s obvious, this was not the case, that in Kennedy’s mind number 2 and number 3 were swapped. The political goal of keeping US hands “clean” was more important than stopping castro. The men of the 2506 Brigade became political pawns. A failed operation would be acceptable as long as the US could maintain that it wasn’t involved.
Of course, in hindsight, we know that ironically Kennedy ended up with number 4, the worst of all possible outcomes. The invasion failed and plausible deniability was blown out of the water. How could “the best and the brightest” have miscalculated and underestimated the media and the intelligence of American people? How could plausible deniability outweigh righting a wrong? 47 years later the Cuban people are still paying for Kennedy’s mistakes. Mistakes that may have cost him his life if you are inclined to believe that castro was responsible for Kennedy’s assassination.
* * *
I can’t believe there are still Cuban-Americans that still don’t understand that Kennedy sold the Brigade down the river as part of his own political machinations.
Get more knowledge at LatinAmericanStudies.org