Our CRACKERJACK(!!!) CIA’s CRACKERJACK (!!!) Che Guevara “Experts”!!!


“This insurgency seems more sophisticated and professional than similar efforts elsewhere in latin America. These guerrillas are well-trained and disciplined and well-schooled in Che’s insurgency techniques.” (report by CIA Director Richard Helms to President Johnson, Aug. 8, 1967.)

A year later Che’s captured diaries were published and revealed that at the very time of the report Che had split his forces and the two bands were bumbling around the Bolivian wilderness in literal circles–starving, bedraggled and often engaging in firefights against each other (!!!) (mistaking each other for the Bolivian enemy!)

So the world’s most feared communist guerrilla–as assessed by the world’s most “expert” intelligence agency–in fact seemed incapable of applying a compass reading to a map!

“Me and my staff were all Fidelistas,” boasted Robert Reynolds, the CIA’s “Caribbean Desk’s specialist on the Cuban Revolution” from 1957-1960.

“Everyone in the CIA and everyone at State was pro-Castro, except (Republican) ambassador Earl Smith.” (CIA operative in Santiago Cuba 1957’59, Robert Weicha.)

“Don’t worry. We’ve infiltrated Castro’s guerrilla group in the Sierra Mountains. The Castro brothers and Ernesto “Che” Guevara have no affiliations with any Communists whatsoever.” (crackerjack Havana CIA station chief Jim Noel 1958.)

I guess old habits die hard.

beck 3

It’s an old story here at Babalu, amigos.

3 thoughts on “Our CRACKERJACK(!!!) CIA’s CRACKERJACK (!!!) Che Guevara “Experts”!!!”

  1. “Che’s insurgency techniques.” Right. The ones he developed against a demoralized, incompetent and corrupt military that would (and did) roll over and play dead for a price, and whose leadership never got serious about defeating an amateur enemy. I mean, the government of Bolivia, for crying out loud, made short work out of Che and his “insurgency techniques,” which should give some idea of how formidable Batista’s people were NOT.

  2. Indeed, Asombra. Sure doesn’t say much about “El Hombre’s!” crackerjack army. Some say it was more a security guard service for the farms of “El Hombre’s!” chums than a professional military. And the proof of the pudding is certainly in the eating.

  3. The would-be statesmen who tried to fill the vacuum left by toppled dictator Machado from 1933 onwards were not up to the task, and they made possible Batista’s rise. This resulted in the army that had been in place until 1933 being gutted and replaced by something much less competent and effective, reflecting the new leadership by a glorified sergeant, which is all Batista was, although he could huff and puff well enough. The deterioration and corruption of the armed forces would eventually prove very costly, as they couldn’t manage what should have been the easy task of overcoming the vastly overrated and overhyped Castro threat. It’s not that the Castro people defeated Batista’s forces, but that said forces defeated themselves.

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